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Regulating Innovative Treatments: Information, Risk Allocation and 
Redress 
 
This special issue features papers culminating from a six seminar ESRC series ‘Liability 
versus innovation: Unpacking Key Connections,’ convened between December 2015 
and September 2017 at Keele, QUT (Brisbane, Australia) and Durham universities.1 
The seminar series was conceived in response to perceptions of scientists and clinicians 
that, despite the pro innovation rhetoric in Government policy documents,2 the threat 
of malpractice liability might stifle innovative treatment (IT).  
 
Such perceptions are supported by two related claims common in medico-legal 
literature – that the threat of legal liability following adverse outcomes causes defensive 
medicine,3 and that the threat of legal liability stifles innovation.4 The extent of these 
problems remains disputed. In particular, the Bolam-Bolitho test of clinical negligence 
in England – which excludes liability for clinical decisions accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of skilled medical peers unless such practice is illogical5 – s arguably 
problematic in terms of incentives to engage in IT. An IT is by definition less likely to 
accord with accepted practice. So, while policy-makers encourage and pay considerable 
lip service to innovation, tort law might give the opposite incentive to clinicians. Or so 
goes the argument.  
 
This debate is topical in terms of policy making. For example: in the UK, the Access to 
Medical Treatments (Innovation) Act 2016 (AMTIA), formerly the Medical Innovation 
Bill (MIB), introduced, until its final stages, a pre-treatment peer approval ‘defence’ to 
protect responsible innovation; in Australia, the statutory defence based on 
Bolam/Bolitho was introduced, despite judicial reluctance to adopt Bolam's deference 
                                                        
1 See: ‘Liability v Innovation: Unpacking Key Connections, An ESRC Seminar Series’ 
<https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/> (accessed 26 October 2018). The support of 
ESRC towards this research is acknowledged.  
2 For example, Government of United Kingdom, ‘Innovate UK’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/innovate-uk> (accessed 26 October 2018). 
3 Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan, ‘Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?’ (1996) 
111(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 353; Gijs van Dijck, ‘Should Physicians be 
Afraid of Tort Claims? Reviewing the Empirical Evidence’ (2015) Journal of European Tort 
Law 282. 
4 Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, ‘Torts and Innovation’ (2008) 107 Michigan Law 
Review 285; Anna B. Laakmann, ‘When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?’ (2015) 
36 Cardozo Law Review 913. 
5 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Bolitho v City and 
Hackney Health Authority [1996] 4 All ER 771. 
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to ‘common professional practice’; 6  and in the US, the ‘right to try’ new drugs 
legislation is enacted.7 
 
 
The investigators - Tsachi Keren-Paz (Principal Investigator), Alicia El Haj, Tina 
Cockburn, Michael Fay and Richard Goldberg - identified the following questions 
which highlight gaps in knowledge which the seminar series aimed to fill, or create 
research networks and collaborations to address:  
 
1. Empirical questions: what is the extent of defensive medicine and of stifled 
innovation; is this a real problem; and if so, in what areas of medicine?  
 
2. Methodological questions: how to define and measure innovation; the extent to 
which changes in legal rules affect levels of defensive medicine and innovation; 
and the relative weight of tort liability and of disciplinary proceedings in 
causing defensive medicine and stifled innovation.  
 
3. Normative questions: how to balance the interests of clinicians, patients 
and society; how best to encourage responsible innovation; whether the 
regulation of ITs and research should change and/or be more closely aligned. 
 
The seminars brought together the main stakeholders: physicians, researchers, policy 
makers, regulators, specialist medical malpractice solicitors and barristers, insurers and 
patients' advocacy groups.  
 
Seminar One examined the broader question of whether fear of tort liability causes 
defensive medicine,8  explored the relationship between defensive medicine and 
innovation and introduced an Australian perspective. An emergent theme was that tort 
liability, or even law, may not trigger defensive practices, but rather there may be other 
causes such as unrealistic societal expectations about acceptable levels of risk and fear 
of damage to professional reputation (including disciplinary action).9 
 
Seminar Two had four related aims. First, to learn from anecdotal evidence of 
regenerative medicine and other clinicians and researchers suggesting that the problem 
exists. Second, to examine conflicting findings in the literature about whether or not 
liability stifles innovation. Third, to explore, mainly from a health economics 
perspective, the methodological difficulties involved in defining and measuring levels 
of innovation. Finally, to scrutinize assumptions, methodologies and findings about the 
                                                        
6 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 22(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 50, 5P; Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 41(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 22(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 59(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5PB(1).  
7  Denise Meyerson, ‘Medical Negligence Determinations, the “Right to Try,” and Expanded 
Access to ITs’ (2017) 14 (3) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 385. In 2017, the Federal Right to 
Try Act was enacted.  
8 We see the stifling of innovation as one potential manifestation of defensive medicine, 
which is, hence, the broader question.  
9 See: ‘The Defensive Medicine Debate’, QUT, (17 December 2015) 
<https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-1/> (accessed 26 October 2018). 
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effect of changes in malpractice liability rules on levels of innovation. A major finding 
was that while anti innovation bias might exist under American law (although this is 
disputed), English law differs so that there is no reliable evidence or robust assumption 
that negligence law stifles innovation. Another conclusion was that developing reliable 
methodology to measure innovation and the effects of changes in the legal rules on 
levels of innovation is not straightforward and requires further work. In particular, there 
is a need for further empirical research to assess whether fear of liability (including 
civil claims and disciplinary action) stifles innovation. 10  
 
Seminar Three examined the defence proposed by the MIB, which hinged on a pre-
treatment peer review of the benefits and risks of the proposed treatment, alternative 
treatments, and no treatment. The seminar explored the proposal’s significance and 
desirability, and the best way forward. Although MIB team representatives declined 
invitations to participate, the stakeholders, including Nigel Poole QC and academic 
researchers, most notably Jose Miola, concluded that: (a) there is no evidence that the 
existing legal framework stifles innovation; (b) the reform proposed by the MIB defence 
was ill -founded because it exposed patients to irresponsible innovation without 
achieving its prime goal of providing a de facto pre-ruling immunity to IT practitioners; 
and (c) there was no consensus on whether better crafted reform proposals, such as 
moving forward in time the Bolam/Bolitho scrutiny before the innovative treatment is 
administered, were necessary or feasible. While the focus of reform proposals has 
related to issues concerning standard of care in the context of determining whether 
innovative treatment is negligent, there was some agreement that attention should also 
focus on issues relating to consent to innovative treatment and provision of information 
to patients to enable informed choice.11  
 
Seminar Four considered the effect of disciplinary proceedings on innovation because 
although most defensive medicine research focuses solely on tort liability and neglects 
disciplinary proceedings, clinicians are likely to be warier of disciplinary proceedings 
than civil claims. While participants agreed that there is anecdotal evidence that 
clinicians are generally more concerned about disciplinary action than civil claims, they 
concluded that there is no evidence that the threat of disciplinary proceedings stifles 
innovation. There are limited examples of disciplinary proceedings relating to IT.12 The 
                                                        
10 See: ‘Does Liability Stifle Innovation? Economic Models and Anecdotal Findings’, Keele, 
(18 April 2016) <https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-2/> (accessed 
26 October 2018). 
11 See: ‘The Medical Innovation Bill and the Access to Medical Treatments (Innovation) B ll : 
Significant Change, or Much Ado About Nothing?’, Durham, (15 September 2016) 
<https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-2/> (accessed 26 October 2018). 
12 In Australia, see: Health Care Complaints Commission v Chen [2018] NSWCATOD 73; 
Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid [2018] NSWCATOD 162; Medical Board of 
Australia v Hocking; Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2015] ACAT 44. In England: 
GMC v Paterson 2703453 (25 July 2017); GMC, Comment on the decision to strike off Dr 
Ian Paterson (GMC, 25 July 2017)  <https://www.gmc-uk.org/news/news-archive/comment-
on-the-decision-to-strike-off-dr-ian-paterson> (accessed 26 October 2018); Paul Bradley, 
‘Professor James Richardson Cleared of Wrong-Doing after Man Dies During Knee Surgery’ 
(Birmingham Mail, 17 February 2013) <https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/local-
news/professor-james-richardson-cleared-wrong-doing-1325420> (accessed 26 October 
2018). 
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risk of registration suspension or cancellation following disciplinary action is low and 
most cases result in no further action. Given this, there was general agreement that the 
development of professional standards/codes of conduct and definitional consensus 
relating to medical innovation is necessary to enable effective regulation for patient 
safety.13  
 
Seminar Five explored: (a) the case for strict liability towards patients injured by ITs; 
and (b) deviation from the patient’s best interest as the sole determinant of standard of 
care and damages in favour of determining liability based on benefits to third parties. 
The MIB’s proposed solution operated within the confines of received wisdom: fault-
based liability, full compensation and the patient's best interest as governing principles 
to determine whether offering the IT is negligent. Seminar five questioned this received 
wisdom. While there was a fairly strong consensus against reducing damages to injured 
patients to reflect benefits to third parties, the proposal that those injured by ITs should 
receive compensation regardless of fault – on either a strict liability basis or a no-fault 
scheme - received considerable support because it was generally regarded as affordable, 
fair and unlikely to stifle innovation.14   
 
Seminar Six examined the relationship between the regulation of research, and of ITs 
and the effects on innovation. Issues addressed included: the distinction between IT and 
research; the relative threat of tort law and regulation on innovation in research; and 
whether the level of compensation to research subjects stifles innovation. There was 
consensus that the blurred boundaries between IT and research created regulatory 
challenges, and discussion of whether the concept of liminality may assist. While there 
was no evidence that the regulation of research stifles innovation, participants 
expressed concern that an overly burdensome regulatory regime may lead to 
circumvention, for example, by using compassionate measures to disguise research as 
IT. It was also recognised that, particularly in the case of access to IT by children, 
hospital ethics committees have an important role to play.15  
 
The questions explored in the seminar series were at the crossroads of five debates 
regarding tort law, and four additional debates external to tort law, pertaining to the 
regulation of the medical profession and the relationship between tort law and other 
modes of regulation. Beginning with tort law, the main and first debate is whether the 
threat of tort liability brings more harm than good, by contributing to defensive 
medicine. Defensive medicine can involve: (a)  care-decisions aimed at minimizing 
exposure to liability, for example by ordering futile or harmful tests, rather than 
providing optimal care; or (b) lower practitioner participation in high-risk specialties 
and/or procedures, due to insurance premium increases.16 In theory, any beneficial 
                                                        
13 See: ‘The Effect of Disciplinary Proceedings’, QUT, (22 February 2017) 
<https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-4/ > (accessed 26 October 
2018). 
14 See: ‘Thinking outside the Box: Strict Liability and Offsetting Risks’, Keele, (4 May 2017) 
<https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-5/> (accessed 26 October 2018). 
15 ‘The Regulation of Research’, Keele, (14 September 2017) 
<https://liabilityinnovation.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-6/> (accessed 26 October 2018). 
16 Tara Bishop and Michael Pesko ‘Does Defensive Medicine Protect Doctors against 
Malpractice Claims?’ (2015) BMJ 351.  
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innovation foregone due to the risk of tort liability is a type of (b), although it could 
also be considered as typifying (a), by providing sub-optimal care. This debate 
intersects with a fault line between law and economics and law and society, specifically 
legal consciousness. While models of economic analysis of law predict that defensive 
medicine ought to be a problem, the empirical support is disputed.17 Certainly in the 
UK, in the context of innovation, the majority of stakeholders participating in the 
seminars believed that no such problem exists, or at least that there is no credible 
evidence supporting its existence. Observations that clinicians might wrongly perceive 
that liability might stifle innovation echo both doubts expressed in behavioural law and 
economics findings on bounded rationality18  and legal consciousness studies, 
suggesting that even professionals have very limited knowledge and understanding of 
the relevant legal rules which regulate and constrain them.19 Another observation, that 
fear from peers’ negative response is a stronger constraint than tort liability, is taken 
forward by Sarah Devaney in her contribution, by exploring the potential of reputation 
enhancing regulation to reduce instances of research misconduct driven by the high 
stakes of successful innovation. Further, as Jose Miola and Tsachi Keren-Paz 
demonstrate in previous writing and in their contributions: (a) the prediction that 
liability will stifle innovation should be examined empirically, allowing for 
jurisdictional differences; and (b) the models should be critically examined to ensure 
that they account for reduced harm from irresponsible innovation deterred by fear of 
liability, rather than uncritically assuming that all innovation has positive social value. 
20 
 
A second tort debate is the proper extent of the court’s deference to expert opinion, 
which in the torts context translates to whether the standard of care is a question of fact, 
law, or a mixture of the two.21  In the UK, there are the twin questions: what was the 
general effect of Bolitho’s gloss on Bolam?; and what was the effect on ITs? With 
respect to the effect of Bolitho, has the possibility of rejecting the peer professional 
endorsement of the clinician’s decision as illogical led to: (a) significant (or any?) 
change in exposure to/extent of liability; and (b) any change in clinical practice? In 
                                                        
17  Gijs van Dijck, ‘Should Physicians Be Afraid of Tort Claims? Reviewing the Empirical 
Evidence’ (2016) 6 Journal of European Tort Law 282. 
18 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thadler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics’, (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471. 
19 See for example: Ahmad Adi and Mohammad Mathbout, ‘The Duty to Protect: Four 
Decades After Tarasoff’ (2018) <https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp-rj.2018.130402> (accessed 
26 October 2018); Tess Neal, Psychologists’ Reasoning in Forensic Cases is Affected by 
Cognitive Biases (paper presented at the American Law and Society Association, Toronto, (9  
June 2018). 
20 Tsachi Keren-Paz, ‘Liability Regimes, Reputation Loss and Defensive Medicine’ (2010) 
18(3) Medical Law Review 363; Tsachi Keren-Paz and Alicia El Haj, ‘Liability versus 
Innovation: The Legal Case for Regenerative Medicine’ (2014) 20(19-20) Tissue Engineering 
Part A 2555; Jose Miola, ‘Bye-bye Bolitho? The Curious Case of the Medical Innovation 
Bill’ (2015) 15(2) Medical Law International 124 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968533215605667> (accessed 26 October 2018). 
21 Strictly speaking, it is a question of fact, but it clearly involves a normative value judgment 
by courts which is not bound by general practice: Baker v Quantum Clothing Group [2011] 
UKSC 17.  
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terms of the effect on innovation, it is unclear whether the Bolitho gloss increases or 
decreases the clinician’s prospects of being liable for injury from IT, and consequently, 
whether there are more or less ITs offered after Bolitho. Reasonable conjectures could 
be made either way, but the questions await robust empirical inquiry. On the one hand, 
Bolitho reduces deference to medical peers by allowing courts to find the defendant 
liable notwithstanding expert evidence suggesting that they conformed to acceptable 
peer practice.  Some commentators argue that the shift to Bolitho increases liability.22 
However, Bolitho arguably shifts liability determinations to a more substantive 
examination of the treatment’s risks and benefits23 in lieu of the putative (and disputed) 
anti-innovation bias of Bolam where deviation from existing practice is indicative of 
negligence. If this is true, there is perhaps a better chance that courts would find ITs to 
be reasonable, despite their deviation from existing practice.  
 
The empirical question was not authoritatively answered during the series and awaits 
research, which should aim to compare both diachronically the same jurisdiction before 
and after a change of the governing legal rule, and synchronically jurisdictions 
operating under different rules. Having said this, the weight of evidence to the MIB 
consultation clearly suggested that the major stakeholders did not believe that the 
Bolam/Bolitho test stifles innovation.24 The relevance of Bolam and Simms v Simms25 
to IT is discussed in this special issue, by Jean McHale and Jonathan Montgomery.  
 
In the US context, the question also relates to expert evidence admissibility rules which 
partially take into account professional peer opinion.26 Professional peer opinion, and 
the extent of deference it ought to command are questions of self-regulation. As such, 
these questions converse with both legal pluralism (how tolerant the legal system 
is/should be to competing normative orders)27 and sociology of the profession (the 
preservation of the privileges that an elite profession has acquired and resistance to 
                                                        
22 Rachael Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s Gloss’ (2010) 
69(3) Cambridge Law Journal 609; Oliver Quick, ‘Patient Safety and the Problem and Potential 
of Law’ (2012) 28(2) Journal of Professional Negligence 78 (who observed that of the 29 
reported medical negligence cases decided since Bolitho, 16 were decided in the claimant's 
favour).  
23 This is disputed. See: Mulheron ibid; Evans Chan, ‘Legal and Regulatory Responses to 
Innovative Treatment’ (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 92; Keren-Paz and El Haj (n 20). 
24 The consultation did not ask, and consultees did not answer what, if any, was the effect of 
the shift from Bolam to Bolitho on innovation. 
25   [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam). This (pre-Mental Capacity Act) decision concerned the 
application of Bolam and the best interests tests to two incapacitated patients (aged 16 and 18) 
in relation to access to IT for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.   
26  Frye v United States 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v Joiner 522 U.S. 136 (1997); 
Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999): discussed by Parchomovsky and Stein, (n 
4) 296-8. 
27 Sally Merry ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22(5) Law and Society 881; Lee J Black, ‘Ethics and 
Law, and Ethics as Law: Legal Pluralism and the Normative Relationship between the State 
and the Medical Profession’ (Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill, 2017) 
<http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1531478644857~7
42> (accessed 13 July 2018).  
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outside scrutiny and control.)28 Conversely, Bolitho’s gloss could be understood as an 
attempt by another elite profession—the judiciary, and more broadly lawyers—to 
ensure that they, rather than clinicians, have the last say in medical malpractice matters. 
 
A third tort debate relates to the role of consent and patients’ autonomy in medical care. 
This is a broad issue, pertaining to medical law beyond tort law,29 nd to tort law in 
non-medical contexts.30 In the IT context, two questions present themselves: (a) 
whether there is a need for a different test for informed consent to ITs given their special 
features (potential conflict of interests, similarity with research, reduced foreseeability 
and optimism bias),31 and what is the relationship between the reasonableness of the 
offered treatment and the patient’s consent; and (b) given that the acceptability of the 
risk to benefit portfolio is essentially subjective, can a patient consent to something that 
objectively is considered as reckless or futile?32  
 
Several contributions tackle both the role of consent in ITs and its relationship with the 
reasonableness of offering IT (Tina Cockburn and Michael Fay, Jonathan Montgomery, 
Tsachi Keren-Paz), and the relationship between IT and research (Nayha Sethi, Jean 
McHale and Sarah Devaney). The most sustained treatment of consent to ITs is offered 
by Cockburn and Fay, who criticise the MIB for practically ignoring the issue of consent 
in the suggested reform. They highlight the possibility that an undisclosed financial 
gain from the treatment might vitiate consent altogether and give rise to liability under 
battery, argue that the fact the treatment is innovative and the risks unknown is material 
and should be disclosed, and stress the relevance of the distinction between innovation 
where conventional treatment has failed, and where innovative therapies are arguably 
unnecessary because lower risk alternatives exist.  
 
Keren-Paz highlights three special features of ITs which are relevant to informed 
consent and its relationship with professional peer review of the treatment. First, 
‘known unknowns’ may increase treatment risks; second, optimism bias—of both 
patients and clinicians—might undermine patients’ ability to provide informed consent; 
and third, a SIROT pattern—significantly improved results over time—might 
exacerbate optimism bias, might reflect a potential conflict of interests affecting the 
clinician, and problematise the evaluation of the treatment as in the patient’s best 
interests. Understanding ITs as typically involving SIROT might also elucidate the 
relationship between the clinical acceptability of the treatment (the Bolam/Bolitho test) 
and informed consent, including whether informed consent can transform what is 
otherwise an unreasonably risky treatment to a reasonable one.  
 
Jonathan Montgomery also considers the relationship between the clinical acceptability 
of the treatment, and the patient’s informed consent. On his analysis, the former is a 
                                                        
28 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ‘Professional Autonomy and the Social Control of Expertise’ in 
Robert Dingwall and Philip Lewis (eds), The Sociology of the Professions: Doctors, Lawyers 
and Others (Quid Pro, LLC 2014) 38. 
29 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] AC 871; R 
v Ian Paterson [2017] EWCA Crim 1625. 
30 James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart 2013).  
31 Chan (n 23);  Parchomovsky and  Stein (n 4), Keren-Paz and El Haj (n 20). 
32 Keren-Paz and El Haj (n 20). 
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question of the validity of offering an IT, and the latter, of accepting it. The latter’s 
validity is determined both by capacity to consent and by the requirement that such 
consent be informed. Montgomery applies and develops this model to the special cases, 
such as of Charlie Gard, where the patient is an incapacitated minor, and therefore a 
question arises as to the parents’ capacity (and the role of court oversight) to accept an 
IT with questionable efficacy. Central to Montgomery’s article is analysing the Charlie 
Gard case through the lenses of tragedy in its Greek/ Shakespearian form: hubris and 
refusal to compromise reasonably with what the protagonists see as evil leading to 
consequences which are deeply destructive, despite good intentions. 
 
A fourth tort law debate the series contributes to concerns tort reform. While the term 
is American, similar debates exist in the UK under the banner of ‘compensation 
culture’.33 The politics underlying calls for tort reform is a right-wing concern for 
protecting business from (often exaggerated) costs of liability, accompanied by an 
individualistic ideology which champions victim’s responsibility to protect themselves 
from the injury or its consequences. This exists alongside a state minimalism ideology 
which favours limiting the role of tort law (which is perceived as a state mechanism to 
redistribute the costs of accidents, or the costs of doing business). 34 Tort reform is 
critiqued from the left (or centre-left) as regressive, empirically unfounded, providing 
unjustified subsidy to businesses, and therefore inefficient, and undermining civil 
liberties—access to courts—and by consequence, unconstitutional.35  
 
Against this context, the MIB, and the AMTIA could be understood as failed attempts 
to curtail the normal protection afforded by tort law through a reform, which, if 
successful, would have left patients with reduced protections against irresponsible 
treatment. The contribution of Jose Miola - a leading academic voice against such 
reform - continues to converse with the tort reform debate (while also contributing to 
an analysis of the dividing line between research and ITs). Miola focuses on the 
database of ITs seemingly created by AMTIA, observing that: this was not an idea 
conceived by the creators of the MIB (and was only reluctantly adopted); the AMTIA 
only permits the Secretary of State to create a database of ITs; and the desirability of 
the database could be questioned. The two main issues discussed by Miola (in addition 
                                                        
33 Richard Lewis, Annette Morris, and Ken Oliphant, ‘Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: 
Is There a Compensation Culture in the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 14 (2) Torts Law Journal 
158. 
34  George Priest, ‘The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law’ (1987) 96 Yale Law 
Journal 1521; Deborah J. La Fetra, ‘Freedom, Responsibility and Risk: Fundamental 
Principles Supporting Tort Reform’ (2003) 36(3) Indiana Law Review 645; Philip K. Howard, 
The Collapse of the Common Good: How America's Lawsuit Culture Undermines Our 
Freedom (Ballantine Books 2001).  
35 See e.g., Koenig, Thomas and Michael Rustad, ‘His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice 
in Disguise’ (1995) 70 Washington Law Review 1; Geoff Boehm, ‘Debunking Medical 
Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises Behind “Tort Reform”’ (2005) 5 Yale 
Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics 357; J. Chase Bryan and others, ‘Are Non-
Economic Caps Constitutional?’ (2013) 80 Defence Counsel Journal 154. Morton Horwitz 
famously described the purpose and effect of 19th century American tort law as providing 
subsidy to enterprise (the railway companies were a prime example) from claims by 
employees and customers: Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1970-1960 
(Oxford University Press 1992). 
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to costs) are the potential undermining of patients’ confidentiality and the possibility 
that by enabling easier dissemination of results of ITs, the database might undermine 
the incentive to undergo clinical trials. These problems tie in with the general approach 
of the MIB/AMTIA, which is almost exclusively doctor-centric. As noted above, this 
focus on defendants/business’ interests is emblematic of a tort reform agenda.     
 
And yet, positioning the MIB/AMITA as an example of tort reform might be doubted 
because the relevant ‘industry’- the UK medical establishment - almost entirely 
opposed the reform.36 That the draft legislation was ill-suited to achieve its intended 
effect - a pre-ruling which would eliminate the risk that ex-post court scrutiny would 
find the intervention negligent - could also explain why the reform did not come to 
pass.37 Yet, the question which remained unresolved after Seminar Three is whether 
other reform was necessary and feasible. We have mentioned above the questions of 
judicial versus medical autonomy in setting the required standard and the gap between 
theoretical economic models and empirical findings. Innovators (and clinicians in 
general) might be operating under optimism bias (and several other biases, such as 
availability bias), but a well-known critique of the negligence standard is that it is 
subject to a hindsight bias.38 Which bias creates the greatest distortion is an empirical 
question that requires further research. It is still an open question, whether a more robust 
mechanism of peer review (Bolam) and judicial scrutiny (Bolitho) could take place prior 
to the decision to proceed (and hence prior to the injury) thereby preventing hindsight 
bias while still securing patients’ safety. But is this suggestion manageable and 
feasible? Moreover, if as the evidence suggests, current rules of tort law do not stifle 
innovation, why fix what ain’t broken? 
 
The answer to this question also converses with tort theory, which is the fifth and last 
debate to which the series contributes. The content of tort rules about liability and 
compensation depends on tort law’s goal(s). Ought its goal(s) be to compensate for 
losses,39 annul wrongful losses,40 rectify wrongs,41 deter inefficient behavior42 or 
vindicate rights?43  On both the compensation and deterrence accounts, a crucial 
                                                        
36 See: National Assembly of Wales Health and Social Care Committee, Report on Legislative 
Consent Memorandum for the Medical Innovation Bill, (29 January 2015), paras 17-20; 
David Hills, ‘Bad Consultation, Bad Bill’ (Wordpress, 23 January 2015) 
https://wanderingteacake.wordpress.com/the-saatchi-bill-2/bad-consultation-bad-bill/  
(accessed 28 October 2018). 
37  José Miola, ‘Bye-bye Bolitho? The Curious Case of the Medical Innovation Bill’ (2015) 
15(2-3) Medical Law International 124. 
38 See: Jeffery Rachlinski, ‘A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight’ (1998) 
65(2) University of Chicago Law Review 571.  
39 Patrick Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Hart Publishing 1997). 
40 Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press 1992). 
41 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press 2007). 
42 Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Cambridge University Press 1987). 
43 Norman Witzleb and Robyn Carroll, ‘The Role of Vindication in the Law of Remedies’ 
(2009) 17 
Tort Law Review 16. 
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question is whether the costs of liability for medical mishaps are borne by the health 
care system (clinicians and institutions) or by the public, mainly by other patients? The 
answer might depend on the ways different health care systems are structured and 
funded (mainly, but not only, on whether the health care system is private or public), 
and on how liability is insured. This crucial question is often neglected in the literature, 
both in terms of insufficient jurisdictional sensitivity and by inconsistently assuming at 
some places that the costs are borne by the health care system and at others, by 
patients.44 The MIB’s underlying assumption was that reform was required to increase 
the supply of ITs not offered due to fear of liability. It implicitly assumed that (a) current 
law stifles innovation; and (b) that the net social value of the foregone innovation is 
positive (namely that the benefits from more useful and responsible innovations will 
outweigh the harm from increased irresponsible innovations). But even if the 
instrumental case for reform (in the direction of reducing liability) is unsound, perhaps 
tort theory’s commitment to justice, can support a reform?  
 
The choice between liability regimes, mostly between negligence and strict liability in 
the context of accident law is a major battleground in tort theory and the terrain covers 
arguments in terms of efficiency,45 corrective justice,46 fairness47 and equality.48 Two 
contributions focus mainly on fairness as justifying strict liability for injuries from ITs 
(Tsachi Keren-Paz, who also examines efficiency) and its limitations (Gregory 
Keating). Applying Stoljar’s concept of unjust sacrifice to IT, Keren-Paz develops a 
restitution-based justification for strict liability (no-fault) towards injuries from ITs. 
The SIROT pattern makes it fair for future patients, who benefit from the knowledge 
gathered from injuries to first in time patients, to share the costs of the injuries which 
brought about this knowledge. The treating physician is a good proxy to the benefits 
captured by future patients so strict liability is fair.  
 
Keating examines this case from the perspective of fairness, by situating it on a 
continuum spanning from rabies’ treatments to universal immunization.  For Keating, 
the crucial questions are identifying the relevant community of risk, intergenerational 
justice, the quality of consent and the related extent to which a lesser harm is pursued 
consciously (a rescue paradigm), and (following Tony Honore) the relevance of a 
political judgment in deciding the level at which risks should be distributed. This latter 
point opens up for further consideration whether strict liability is indeed to be equated 
with a no-fault scheme, as is implicitly assumed in Keren-Paz’s argument.    
                                                        
44 See e.g., Ariel Porat, ‘Offsetting Risks’ (2007) 106 Michigan Law Review 243, 264-6 
(discussing defensive medicine and assuming that costs of liability are internalised by 
physicians), 268 (the drawbacks from liability ‘are shouldered by the patient, with the result 
that the excessive liability leads to a diminishment in the overall utility a patient can derive 
from her doctor’s services’). 
 
45 See e.g., Robert Cooter, ‘Prices and Sanctions’ (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1523. 
46  See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 
151. 
47 George Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85(3) Harvard Law Review 
537; Gregory C. Keating, ‘Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents’ 
(2000) 74 Southern California Law Review 193.  
48 See e.g., Tsachi Keren-Paz, Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice (Ashgate 2007). 
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Tort theory, especially from the law and society and legal realism lineage (and 
alongside other branches of legal theory), is also interested in the relationship between 
legal and non-legal sanctions, and in particular, the role of reputation in curbing anti-
social behavior. A central question is whether and how reputational loss from the 
underlying event and/or the legal response should be taken into account by courts and 
regulators in setting sanctions. This is explored mainly in the context of repeat players 
such as businesse  and professionals.49 Sarah Devaney contributes to this debate by 
exploring the role of reputation in the regulation of medical research. Devaney explores, 
with a focus on recent high-profile research misconduct cases, how the ‘winner-takes-
all’ paradigm pressures researchers and might lead some to unethical or scientifically 
dubious conduct. Situating her argument within the smart regulation literature, 
Devaney demonstrates how solidarity, which she identifies as a main feature of research 
communities, makes reputation - both positive and negative - a useful regulatory tool 
and offers several reforms to inculcate researchers’ concern for reputation to reduce the 
incidence of research misconduct. Keren-Paz, in concluding that strict liability is 
unlikely to reduce efficiency (and might even be efficient, although any significant 
effect could be doubted50) also relies, in examining clinicians’ incentives, on the 
reduced reputation loss that each finding of liability is likely to produce under a strict 
liability rule.51    
 
So far, we have discussed five conversations endemic to tort law, with which 
contributions to the special issue, and more broadly the seminar series, engage: 
deterrence, deference to expert opinion, the role of consent, tort reform and tort theory. 
However, the relationship between innovation and liability, is relevant to at least four 
conversations which are external to tort law. First, when tort law is understood (within 
an instrumental tradition, such as economic analysis of law) as one regulatory option, 
there is the question of its relationship with other regulatory tools such as disciplinary 
proceedings, professional/ethical codes of practice, criminal law and regulation.52  
 
Second, tort law (and possibly law in general) has only a limited role to play in the 
advancement of innovation. An innovation agenda is political currency across 
jurisdictions, political economies and constitutional regimes and transcends the 
boundaries of medical or scientific innovation. The historian Yuval Noah Harari ties 
the commitment to innovation (and more generally reform and change) with modernity, 
commenting that it would be political suicide for a political party to endorse in its 
platform that it will attempt to maintain the status quo.53 Commitment to innovation is 
found, for example, within academia, by using innovation as a criterion for assessing 
                                                        
49 See e.g., Peter Cartwright, ‘Publicity, Punishment and Protection: The Role(s) of Adverse 
Publicity in Consumer Policy’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 179.  
50 From patients’ perspectives, because a treatment is hoped to be in their best interest, the 
positive externality to future patients involved in ITs is not likely to create a cooperation 
problem deterring them from submitting to the treatment.   
51 Keren-Paz (n 20). 
52 Peter Cane, ‘Tort Law as Regulation’ (2002) 31(4) Common Law World Review 305; 
Willem van Boom, Meinhard Lukas and Christa Kissling (eds), Tort and Regulatory Law 
(Springer 2007). 
53 Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Harper 2011) 365. 
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research and teaching excellence, and for making funding, promotions and recruitment 
decisions.54   Broadly speaking, and being mindful of the well-known caveats, 
intellectual property, and especially patent law is all about rewarding and incentivising 
innovation. Within science, and especially medical science, the main barriers for 
innovation are funding and regulation55 (here, narrowly conceived) rather than liability, 
as concluded in seminars one and six.  
 
Third, in the medical context, the broader regulatory framework of innovation has to 
define ‘treatment’, ‘IT’ and research and appreciate the overlap between the three; and 
also decide how to regulate each, including consideration of whether a more unified 
approach is called for research/IT or innovative/standard treatment.56 Fi ally, we have 
noted above the complex relationship between objective determinations of whether the 
treatment is appropriate (which is arguably another way of asking whether it is in the 
patient’s best interests, which according to Bolam requires acceptance as appropriate 
by peers) and the patient’s subjective wishes, which is a question of informed consent. 
These questions become especially thorny in the case of patients who lack capacity, for 
whom the law has to determine the validity and conclusiveness of advance healthcare 
directives (when available), the roles of proxies (such as parents for young children and 
infants) and the level of courts’ oversight. 57  A subset of such cases involves 
incapacitated patients whose condition is fatal and for whom an IT or participation in a 
clinical trial is offered. The recent high-profile UK Charlie Gard case, which (alongside 
the Alfie Evans case) attracted global attention, s analysed by Jonathan Montgomery, 
together with the typical issues such cases pose to the regulation of (arguably 
innovative) treatment of incapacitated persons. 
     
Several other articles in this special issue, as well as seminars Four (the role of 
disciplinary proceedings) and Six (regulation of research) contribute to these four 
debates. Despite the prediction that clinicians are likely to be more concerned about 
adverse findings in disciplinary proceedings than about civil liability in torts, there is 
no clear evidence that disciplinary proceedings stifle innovation. Accordingly, the 
                                                        
54 The new organisation directing research funding in the UK is called UK Research and 
Innovation; and the quality of research outputs is assessed based on ‘originality’ (alongside 
rigour and significance). Innovation in learning and teaching is a criterion both in the new 
Teaching Excellence Framework <https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-
guidance/teaching/> (accessed 28 October 2018) and in many universities’ academic promotion 
proforma. There is also increased number of academic posts with ‘innovation’ in the post’s 
title.    
55 See e.g., Shuai Xu and Aaron Kesselheim, ‘Medical Innovation Then and Now: 
Perspectives of Innovators Responsible for Transformative Drugs’ (2014) 42 Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics 564; Justine Cadet, ‘CRT: Lack of Funding is Stifling US Medical 
Innovation’ Cardiovascular Business (Cardiovascular Business, 8 March 2011)  
<https://www.cardiovascularbusiness.com/topics/coronary-intervention-surgery/crt-lack-
funding-stifling-us-medical-innovation> (accessed 28 October 2018). 
 
56 See e.g., Therese Murphy ‘Repetition, Revolution and Resonance’ in Therese Murphy (ed), 
New Technologies and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2009) 1; Brierley and Larcher, 
‘Compassionate and Innovative Treatments in Children: A Proposal for an Ethical Framework’ 
(2009) 94 Arch Dis Child 651. 
57 See e.g., Re B [1987] 2 All ER 206. 
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relative weight of disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis tort liability (and the related 
question whether changes to the rules about the scope of civil liability are likely to 
matter as long as the exposure to responsibility under disciplinary proceedings remains 
intact) are yet to be explored, although the effect of disciplinary proceedings might be 
small.  
 
The role of criminal law, and of other regulatory tools, at times alongside tort law, is 
explored in contributions by Tina Cockburn and Michael Fay, Jean McHale, Sarah 
Devaney, and Nayha Sethi, with particular reference to Paulo Macchiarini and Ian 
Paterson. Thus Cockburn and Fay call for a better regulatory framework for ensuring 
meaningful consent to ITs; McHale calls for regulating innovating treatments in tandem 
with research under the auspices of the Health Research Authority (HRA); Sarah 
Devaney explores the potential of reputation-enhancing regulatory tools; and Nayha 
Sethi posits the usefulness of the concepts of continuum and liminality to understanding 
the relationship between treatment, innovation and research and to a superior regulatory 
approach. Definitional uncertainty, the barriers between research and IT and the case 
for a more aligned regulation of both are also discussed by McHale. The contested 
usefulness of the database of IT permitted by the AMTIA to the innovation/barriers 
agenda (alongside a broader discussion of the relationship between IT and research) is 
considered by Jose Miola.  
 
The relationship between research and ITs and how the two should be defined and 
regulated is at the centre of Nayha Sethi, Jean McHale and Sarah Devaney’s 
contributions. Sethi begins with exploring some of the ways in which the received 
treatment-research distinction is collapsing due to increasingly blurred boundaries 
within healthcare and health research, and that in order to better understand and regulate 
innovation, we must appreciate its relationship to treatment and research. She then 
argues how the anthropological concept of liminality, with its preoccupation with 
transformation, thresholds and processual and experiential dynamics could enable a 
better regulatory approach to ITs, treatments and research. This could be achieved by 
better acknowledging that standard treatment, IT and research are on a continuum, and, 
crucially, explicitly acknowledging that both therapeutic and research activities and 
intentions may coincide. Additionally, she argues that regulatory approaches need to 
better account for, and reflect the experiences of actors implicated within the innovation 
setting. 
 
The blurred line between innovation and research, and the commonality of 
experimentation in both, is also highlighted by McHale. Noting the absence of an 
adequate regulatory framework for ITs, she supports applying aspects of the regulatory 
framework of research to IT, while acknowledging that the existing research framework 
is far from perfect. McHale views the existence of the database, authorised by the 
AMTIA as a potentially significant breakthrough in that it recognises the need for 
evidence-based medicine, embeds the idea that departure from ‘accepted practice’ 
needs to be documented, and could ultimately lead to enhanced transparency of 
decision making and enhanced availability of data regarding innovation. McHale’s and 
Sethi’s views are in some tension with Miola’s skepticism about whether a database of 
IT is a good idea, and in particular, whether it is likely to undermine incentives to recruit 
participants in clinical trials. While acknowledging AMTIA’s definitional challenges as 
to what ought to be included in the database, both McHale and Sethi consider the 
database as a potential positive step towards a more unified regulatory approach to ITs 
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and research (McHale) and an appreciation of IT as a liminal space (Sethi). Indeed, as 
McHale’s call for better aligning (and improving) the regulatory framework of research 
and ITs attests to, a comprehensive regulatory framework ought to ensure that negative 
results are recorded and are easily accessible to enhance patients’ safety, and minimize 
optimism bias and waste of resources. AMTIA’s alleged increased oversight of ITs 
could also be contrasted with the likely effect of the MIB/AMTIA liability provisions, 
which would have likely reduced the oversight over IT, to the detriment of patient 
safety. 
 
The role and relevance of new technologies—such as robots and artificial intelligence 
in diagnosis and treatment58 - did not feature explicitly in the series. However, the 
general conclusions about the relationship between legal and professional liability and 
(1) willingness to innovate, (2) the required level of consent and (3) the appropriate 
level of redress are presumably pertinent here as well, although more detailed attention 
is required. As the emerging debate in the context of autonomous cars demonstrates,59 
artificial intelligence in particular might raise special questions with regards to the 
‘authorship’ of mishaps and hence to the allocation of responsibility.  
 
In the Australian case, Mount Isa Mines Pty Ltd v Pusey, Justice Windeyer 
acknowledged the challenges faced by the law in keeping up with medical innovation, 
when he described law as ‘marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a little.’60 
The articles in this special edition engage in thoughtful discussion of the blurred 
boundaries between IT and research, issues relating to the provision of information, 
risk allocation and avenues of redress, including compensation and disciplinary action. 
The authors make important contributions towards the development of regulatory 
responses to IT which aim to balance the interests of clinicians, patients and society 
and encourage responsible innovation.   
 
                                                        
58 See e.g., Fei Jiang and others, ‘Review: Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present 
and Future’ (2017) 2(4) Stroke and Vascular Neurology 230 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/svn-
2017-000101> (accessed 28 October 2018); Michael Carson and Greg McEwen,  ‘Artificial 
Intelligence Misdiagnosis: Who is to Blame?’ (Lawyer Monthly, 27 February 2018) 
<https://www.lawyer-monthly.com/2018/02/artificial-intelligence-misdiagnosis-who-is-t
blame/> (accessed 28 October 2018). 
59 See e.g., Kyle Graham, ‘Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and its 
Assimilation of Innovations’ (2012) 52 Santa Clara Law Review 1241; Kieran Tranter, ‘The 
Challenges of Autonomous Motor Vehicles for Queensland Road and Criminal Laws’, (2016) 
16 QUT Law Review 59. 
60 (1970) 125 CLR 383, [3].  
